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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
GREAT SALT LAKE AUTHORITY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Case No.
10395

ISLAND RANCHING COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
It would serve little purpose to state in this supporting
Brief the facts underlying this Appeal. They are not in
contest and are already set out in paragraph 1 of the majority opinion ::..nd in the appeal briefs of the parties. The
full set of legal issues framed by the pleadings and presented in the Appeal has also been outlined in paragraph
2 of the majority opinion and paragraph 1 of the dissent of
the Chief Justice. They will not be again recited in this
Brief, except as they may relate to the grounds for Appellant's Petition for Rehearing.
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This Brief will, accordingly, focus upon the particular
grounds, defined in the foregoing Petition, upon which
ISLAND RANCHING COMPANY urges that a rehearing
of the case on its merits be ordered and undertaken by the
Court.
GROUND I.

Grant of Em·inent Domain Power Issue
a.

THE MAJORITY OPINION, IN DETERMINING THAT GSLA HAS BEEN GRANTED THE
POWER TO CONDEMN ANTELOPE ISLAND,
HAS ERRONEOUSLY IGNORED THE RULE
OF CONSTRUCTION THAT THE EMINENT
DOMAIN POWER IS STRICTLY CONSTRUED
AGAINST THE PARTY SEEKING ITS EXERCISE.

The eminent domain power is not granted when
its existence is dependent upon implied construction.
In the ninety years this Court has decided controversies, it has not faced a more fundamental and substantial
question than the "grant of eminent domain power" issue
presented in this Appeal. Only eight times in that ninety·
year span has a question of similar import been raised. 1
1

Bertagno[e V. Baker. supra; Barnes V. Wade, 90 Utah l, 58 P. 2d 297
1936); Utah Copper Co. V. Stephen Hayes Estate, 83 Utah 545, 31
P. 2d 624 (1934); Town of Perry V. Thomas, 82 Utah 159, 22 P.
2d 343 (1933); Alcorn V. Reading, 66 l.rtah 509, 243 Pac. 922
(1926); Mone/air Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consol. Mines Co ..
53 Utah 413, 174 Pac. 172 (1918); Ketchum Coal Co. v. Pleasant
Valley Coal Co., 50 Utah 390, 168 Pac. 86 (1917): Tanner V. Prouo
Bench Canal f5 Irrigation Co., 40 Utah 105, 121 Pac. 584 (1911).
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The last time was sixteen years ago in Bertagnole v. Baker,
et al., 117 Utah 348, 215 P. 2d 626 (1950). With footings
cemented in basic concepts of constitutional law, the issue
centers upon the relationship of government to the property
rights of the citizen. Its consideration and resolution in
this case, by definition, will affect the posture of ninety
years of judicial precedent in this State as to that relationship.
Generically, the question is:
To meet the demands of constitutional due process
of law, what is the character of legislative power that
must be granted to an administrative agency in order
for it to take, by eminent domain, a man's property
against his will ?
is:

The issue presented, as applied to the facts of this case,
Is the GSLA law, in providing that the property
of Island Ranching Company shall be acquired by
"donation, purchase agreement, lease, or other lawful
means" a constitutionally adequate grant of the eminent domain power when measured by the requirements that the legislative delegation be specific, and
the guarantee of the citizen that his property shall not
be "taken" without due process of law?

The keys to this question lie in the roots and morals
of our society, and involve the very essence of the democratic order as we now know it. They have been encased in
the annals of legislative thought and the inviolate core of

-judicial opinion in this country for almost two centuries of
time. The principle fashioned of these times is simple: A
man's property shall not be taken from him against his
will by the government, unless through the legislative exercise of the power of eminent domain. There is an equally
simple corollary : The eminent domain power shall not be
exercised by a government agency of limited jurisdiction
unless it is in 8trict compliance w Eth a plain and unequivcal statutory grant. This principle and its corollary have
their origin in the beginnings of this country. "The preservation of property is a primary object of the social compact," wrote the United States Supreme Court in VanH orne' s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304 ( 1795). "Property
must be secured," wrote John Adams, "or liberty cannot
exist." 2 And Justice Field in the Sinking Fund Cases, 99
U. S. 700 (1879) said:
"All history shows that rights of person are unsafe where property is unsecure. Protection to one
goes with protection to the other; and there can be
neither prosperity nor progress where this foundation of all just government is unsettled."
And so it was that the right to hold property against
unlawful government expropriation was secured in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution and Section 7 of Article 1, Constitution of
Utah:
"No person should be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law."
2

The Works of John Ac!ims, Vol. 6, p. 280 (C. F. Adams, Ed. 1851)

To insure that the right to hold property free of unauthorized government action is afforded co-existent protection with the guaranties of life and liberty under the
Due Process Clause, the courts have been consistent in their
vigil that in determining whether the eminent domain
power has been granted to an administrative agency, it is
presumptively construed strictly against the party in quest
of its exercise, and where the power can be made out only
through argument, construction, or implication (i.e., where
it is not delegated as to particular property in the clearest
of language) the attempt<:d exercise will be denied. The
Supreme Court of Washington, in State of Washington v.
Superior Court, et al., 19 Wash. 2d 791, 144 P. 2d 916, 920
( 1944) , states the rule :
"The right to exercise the power of eminent
domain is one of the highest powers exercised by
the sovereign. This right will not be implied, nor
will it be extended beyond express statutory authority. The law is clearly stated in 1 Lewis on Eminent
Domain, 3d Ed., p. 679, §371, as follows: 'The exercise of the power being against common right, it
cannot be implied or inferred from vague or doubtful language, but must be given in express terms or
by necessary implication. When the right to exercise the power can only be made out by argument
and inference, it does not exist. "There must be no
effort to prove the existence of such high corporate
right, else it is in doubt, and, if so, the state has
not granted it."'" (Emphasis added.)
The great Justice Wolfe was fully aware of this cardinal rule when he wrote for a unanimous court in Bertagnole v. Baker, et al., 117 Utah 348, 215 P. 2d 626 (1950):
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"The right of eminent domain, being in derogation of the rights of individual ownership in property, has been strictly construed by the courts so
that no person will be wrongfully deprived of the
use and enjoyment of his property. (Citing authorities * * *" (P. 628 of 215 P. 2d.)
Although the Salt Lake City Board of Education, in
Bertagnole, made its showing that the attempted condemnation was for a school use, that public necessity existed,
and that there was a general legislative grant of eminent
domain power, it was denied the power to condemn outside
of its boundaries because the statute did not specifically
authorize such:
"Thus it follows that the authority contended
for by the School Board not having been expressly
given and not being clearly inferable from our statutes, must be denied it. Under the authorities on
this subject, power cannot be derived frorn the
doubtful inf er enc es which support the School
Board's claim of authority." (P. 630 of 215 P. 2d.)
(Emphasis added.)
The Bertagnole case is the last word spoken by this
Court on the constitutional necessity of a clear, precise and
unequivocal statutory grant of the eminent domain power
to condemn particular property. The last word, that is,
until the majority opinion in this case. That opinion is
written as though Bertagnole v. Baker had never been decided, 3 as though the strong precedent of this Court and
the legions of cases throughout the Country which affirm

Bertagnole, did not exist.
a The main opinion does not cite or refer to the Bcrtagnole case in the two
paragraphs it devotes to the eminent domain issue.
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The majority opinion, while quick to refer to the presumption favoring the constitutionality of legislative enactments in discussing other issues in the case, fails totally to
note or even observe the presumption that a grant of eminent domain is strictly construed against the condemnor
and that it will not be upheld where its validity is in doubt
or sustained only through argument. It treats the eminent
domain question in this case as one of typical statutory
construction, \Yithout apparent consideration of the longestablished respect for the basic and natural right of man
to own and hold property as against an unauthorized government expropriation. The opinion gives no attention to
the claims of Appellant that the attempted "taking" is violative of the "property" section of the Due Process Clause
of both Federal and State Constitutions, and as stated, it
completely ignores the time-honored presumption of strict
construction against the legislative grant of eminent domain.
We view this omission in the majority opinion as critical in this Petition for Rehearing. This is not a case
where Appellant simply is out of harmony with the conclusion of the majority opinion. Rather, it is a case where
the main opinion has overlooked, ignored, or failed to consider a substantive, material and vital point of the Appeal.
Such omission makes it proper that this case be reheard and decided, taking stock of the property, due process and construction arguments raised in the Appeal and
re-urged in this Petition. Utah Savings & Loan Assn. V.
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Mecham, 12 U. 2d 335, 366 P. 2d 598 (1961); Brown v.
Pickard, 4 Utah 292, 9 Pac. 573 (1886).

b.

THE INTERPRETATION GIVEN BY THE MAJORITY OPINION TO THE PHRASE "BY DONATION, PURCHASE AGREEMENT, LEASE
OR OTHER LAWFUL MEANS" IN THE STATUTE, IN HOLDING THAT THE SAME BESTOWS THE EMINENT DOMAIN POWER AS
TO ANTELOPE ISLAND, IS ERRONEOUS,
WI T H 0 UT JUDICIAL PRECEDENT, AND
FAILS TO CONSIDER A MATERIAL ELEMENT.

The majority opinion acknowledges that the authority
of Plaintiff to condemn Antelope Island stems from 65-86 ( 10), which provides in part:
"The authority is authorized to take any steps
that are necessary to secure such part of Antelope
Island by donation, purchase agreement, lease, or
other lawful means * * *."
This is the only section of the Law wherein the manner of acquiring Antelope Island is specified by the Legislature. Clearly, the means of acquisition set out therein
are voluntary and exclusive of eminent domain. Donation,
purchase agreement and lease all require the consent of the
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Island owner. To gain its meaning of the phrase "or other
lawful means" in Section (10), the majority opinion
chooses not to refer to two principles of statutory construction, ejusdem generis and expressio unius est exclusio alterius, both of which restrict the mode of acquiring Antelope Island to consensual and non-forceful means. Instead
it prefers to rely on a different Section, 65-8-6 (1) 4 which
delineates the manner of acquiring unspecified property by
Plaintiff.
From this process, the majority opinion concludes that
it is "clearly apparent" that the eminent domain power was
delegated as to Antelope Island because without the power,
"it is obvious that the purposes of the act could not be carried out". (Majority Opn. P. 3, Para. 3).
To begin 'vith, it is error to interpret a Statute in the
context of what the Legislature should obviously have done
to implement and make effective the Law. The question is,
rather, what did the Legislature actually say on the matter.
The majority opinion, in rejecting the rule of construction, ejusdem generis, does an about face from the position
taken by this Court just six months ago in State Land
Board v. State Dept. of Fish and Game, 17 U. 2d 237, 408
P. 2d 707 (Dec. 1965). In that case, the Court was called
upon to determine whether a statute which reserved "coal
and other minerals", included sand and gravel. This Court
held that under the "universally recognized rule" of ejusdem
4

This Section provides that eminent domain may be employed to acquire
non-specific real property. It makes no mention, however, of Antelope
Island, as does 65-8-6 (10).
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generis, a general term following a specific term is
interpreted to mean things of like kind or character. Ergo,
sand and gravel, although otherwise a mineral, were not
encompassed within the statutory phrase "coal and other
minerals". The stand taken in the Land Board case is clear
precedent for the same approach in the case at bar. The
application of ejusdem generis together with the presumption of strict construction against stci.tutes allegedly granting the power of eminent domain (the latter, the main
opinion ignores altogether), would dictate a result drastically different from that reached by the majority opinion
in this case. And that is without referring at all to the
principle, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which this
Court has seen fit to adopt in times past. 5
The majority opinion makes a break with judicial
precedent that is patently in error when it looks to the
general clause 65-8-6 ( 1) (granting eminent domain as to
non-particular property) as controlling the specific clause
in 65-8-6 (10), which instructs as to the manner of acquiring Antelope Island. Precedent and the warranted rationale support the holding that the special clause ("donation,
purchase agreement, lease, or other lawful means") in its
independent and particular reference to Antelope Island,
controls and is an exception to the _general clause which
makes no reference to the Island. For as this Court said
in Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 60 Utah 423, 209
Pac. 207 ( 1922) :
5

Rapid Transit Co. v. Ogden City, et al., 89 Utah 546, 58 P. Zd 1
(1936).
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"Further, it is an elementary doctrine that,
where two statutes treat of the same subject-matter,
the one general and the other special in its provisions, the special provision controls the general."
Although the majority opinion turns away the doctrine
of ejusdem generis, it significantly fails to discuss or even
mention the principle that where two sections of a statute
treat the same subject matter. one of general and the other
of special import, the special controls the general.
But there is another material element of this issue
which the majority opinion fails to pass upon. If, as the
main opinion concludes, the legislative intent was that the
special means of acquiring Antelope Island in 65-8-6 ( 10)
"donation, purchase agreement, lease, or other lawful
means" refers to and is controlled by the general grant in
65-8-6 (1), why then was the special means as to Antelope
Island inserted in subsection ( 10) at all? In such event,
why didn't the Legislature merely rely upon the general
clause in subsection (1) since that covers adequately the
eminent domain power. Both questions are relevant, welltaken, and follow logically in response to the position announced by the main opinion. The Legislature provides its
own answer to these questions which answer is inconsistent
with the majority opinion. After finishing the general clause
as to non-specific property, it went on to spell out the precise manner in which Antelope Island was to be acquired, to
the precise exclusion of the eminent domain power. Unless
We assume that the Legislature was involved in a handwriting exercise, that it did not know what it was doing,
and that it did not mean what it said, the ordinary meaning
and intent of 65-8-6 ( 10) as to Antelope Island must be
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given effect. The majority opinion has failed to treat this
question or to supply an answer to it.
It should consider the question by granting a rehearing of the eminent domain issue on its merits.
GROUND II.

Territorial Lim,itaM.on Issue
THE MA.TORITY OPINION, TO DETERMINE
AND FIND THE TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF
GSLA, HAS ERRONEOUSLY RELIED EXCLUSIVELY UPON THE TITLE TO THE GSLA
LAW RATHER THAN THE ENACTED LAW
ITSELF.
The majority opinion finds that the Great Salt Lake
and its environs is the territorial boundary of the Great
Salt Lake Authority:

"* * * Applying that principle here leaves
no doubt that the phrase, 'Great Salt Lake and its
environs,' even though appearing in sections not
specifically delineating boundaries, was intended to
describe the area over which Plaintiff was to have
jurisdiction. * * *" (Emphasis ours) Majority Opn., p. 1.
The search for authority to support this finding is not
easy. Under any rule of statutory construction, including
in pari materia which the majority opinion invokes, the
Statute does not yield such result. No section of the Statute declares the territorial limitation of Plaintiff to be "the
Great Salt Lake and its environs." Nor does the Statute
when considered in its entirety "so as to produce an harmonious whole and ... give effect to the intent and purpose
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to be devined from the entire act," define the boundaries
as such. (Quotation from Majority Opn. p. 1, para. 4).
The only possible basis for the majority opinion's
finding is the assumption that the Legislature, in its great
wisdom, must have intended that some boundary line be
established, and if the term "Great Salt Lake and its environs" in the Statute is not grasped as the boundary line,
there is nothing else in the enacted Law which remotely
lends itself to a territorial description. In other words, the
gist of the main opinion's argument is that while the "Great
Salt Lake and its environs" is not a good boundary definition, it is the closest the Act comes to such a definition,
and because of the presumption favoring constitutionality6 ,
close is better than nothing at all.
The argument, the same as the State made in the Appeal, is fallacious. Close has never been nor is it now, a
satisfactory test when this Court has before it for constitutional interpretation the geographical boundaries of an
agency of limited jurisdiction. The natural right of man
to hold property which may or may not be affected by that
limited jurisdiction is at stake in such interpretation. The
assumption that the Legislature must have intended a territorial boundary in the Statute is erroneous and unfounded
both in law and the facts of this case. The Statute, itself,
gives every evidence of the fact that the territorial boundary
6

The Majority Opinion prefaces its discussion of the
in this case with the statement that the Court will
with reluctance and only where clearly necessary and
construed as constitutional whenever reasonable. P. 1,

Opn.

constitutional issues
strike down an act
that the act will be
para. 3 of Majority

was entirely omitted by the Legislature. The omission
may have been unintentional, but the hard fact is nonetheless, that no boundary was described.
The main opinion suggests that this Defendant acknowledges that the Statute describes the boundary as the
"Lake and its environs" and argues that the term is merely
indefinite and uncertain. (Majority Opn., p. 1, para. 4).
This statement does not represent the position of ISLAND
RANCHING COMP ANY in this Appeal. Our position has
been and is now, that the law is utterly void of a declaration of territorial boundaries. There is no line of limitation within which GSLA jurisdiction is fixed. Appellant
assessed in its appeal brief the term "Great Salt Lake and
its environs" as a boundary definition, only because of the
argument advanced by the State in that regard before the
trial court. To conclude that the established boundary is
the "Lake and its environs" is not to construe the Statute.
It is to improvise upon and enlarge it.
Nevertheless, the main opinion, having found that the
boundary is the "Great Salt Lake and its environs," takes
note that the meaning of the term gives "rise to some uncertainty." (Majority Opn., p. 2, line 3). There can be no
quarrel with that observation. The term, in the very nature of things, is not susceptible to objective measurement.
One does as well by saying the boundary is the "Great Salt
Lake and other reasonable areas". To overcome this obscurity, the main opinion turns to the title of the Statute,
which in turn refers to the "meander line established by
the United States Surveyer General." The legal relevancy
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of the title and the judicial framework within which the
title is to be examined is laid down preliminarily in the
main opinion :

"* * * w e are aware t hat m
. many decisions, including our own, it has been stated that the
title is not part of the act. This is true in the sense
that it is not integrated into the operating portion
of the legislation; and that it will not be permitted
to contradict nor defeat a plainly expressed intent;
nor can it be used to create an ambiguity or uncertainty when the language of the body of the act is
clear. But where such clarity is lacking, it is permissible to look to the title of the enactment to shed
light on and clarify the meaning." Majority Opn.,
p. 2, para. 1.
The meaning of this statement is plain - the title to
a law has no statutory rank, it cannot be employed as such,
and it will not be permitted to introduce into a statute a
substantive factor not already a part of the enactment.
Having thus recorded the prevailing rule of law, the
majority opinion proceeds to immediately violate it by employing the title in such manner that it, and not the Statute,
fixes the jurisdictional boundary of the Great Salt Lake
Authority. Whereas, the title refers to "the meander line
established by the ... Surveyer General", it is crystal clear
from the Statute that there is no correlation, association,
nor relationship whatsoever, between the meander line and
the "Great Salt Lake and its environs." The main opinion
does not refer to one section of the Statute wherein the
two terms would begin to complement each other. In the
only section of the Statute (65-8-6(8)) in which the "me-
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ander line" phrase is used, the term "Great Salt Lake and
its environs" is also found. It is manifest from that section
that the two terms are not interchangeable, that they do
not speak of the same area, and that the meander line does
not amplify or explain the meaning of the Great Salt Lake
and its environs. They are at separate stations on the
spectrum with no connecting linkage.
There is only one reason why, to use the language of
the main opinion, the meander line in the title "gives a
sufficiently clear and satisfactory indication of what is
meant by the 'Great Salt Lake and its environs'". (Majority Opn., p. 2, para. 1) . That is because the main opinion
says so. The upshot of this judicial innovation is that the
title, not the Statute, supplies and is the territorial boundary, since it carries the only term that is reasonably the
subject of ascertainment. Such result is not only against
the sound precedent of this Court; it permits an otherwise
invalid statute to be upheld by furnishing to it a constitutional requirement from a source outside of the enactment.
A rehearing should be granted to correct this erron·
eous holding.
GROUND III.

Delegation of Legislat1".ve Authority Issue
THE MAJORITY OPINION, IN DETERMINING
THAT THE GSLA LA Vv' IS NOT UN CONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF
LEGISLATIVE STANDARDS, HAS TOTALLY
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FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE LAW
DOES NOT SPECIFY OR DELEGATE PERFORMANCE OF THE LEGISLATIVE OBJECTIVES TO BE ACHIEVED.
In discussing this issue, the majority opinion states:
"We offer no defense of the Act as a model of
legislative draftsmanship."
Nonetheless, the majority opinion finds that the Act
contains an adequate constitutional basis, against the attack that it is vague, ambiguous, and lacks legislative objectives, said basis being that the agency is required to
adopt reasonable regulations, that it is prohibited from
lending the credit of the State to private purposes, that it
exercise the condemnation power in accordance with the
general law, and that:
"The Authority shall have power to determine
the policies and develop the program best designated to accomplish the objectives and purposes set
out in this Act." 65-8-4.
In so concluding, the majority opinion has by-passed
or failed to consider the leading point in this issue. That
is, that the Act is in default in stating what the legislative
objectives of the Statute are. It leaves to the administrative body not ouly the power to determine what policies are
best designed to accomplish an objective, but it leaves as
well the determination of the objective. 1 It is in this calling
1

65-8-6 (5) is not, as the main opinion would indicate, declarative of the
legislative objective. It simply suggests one of several admini.strative policies which the agency may or may not employ to accomplish an undetermined legislativ~ objective.

22
that the Law is constitutionally deficient. To the agency
is left the decision of what is to be accomplished and the
method of accomplishment. The latter is legally permissible; the former constitutes an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power. This Court has heretofore placed the
issue at rest:
"That the legislature may not surrender or
delegate its legislative power is elemental . . . the
legislature must clearly mark the course to be pursued and the principles, facts, and purposes to serve
as guide posts to enable the officer to carry out not
his own will or judgment but that of the legislature."
Rowell v. State Board of Agriculture, 98 Utah 353,
99 P. 2d 1 (1940).
The Act standing by itself is of slim and frail existence. When it is measured, however, in the light of Appellant's constitutional guarantee to due process of law and
its right to statutory notice of how its property will be
affected, altered, or disrupted by action of the administrative agency, the Statute is intolerable and should be stricken
down.
A rehearing of this issue by the Court should be ordered.
GROUND IV & CONCLUSION

Due Process of Law Issue
THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
INFIRMITIES OF THE STATUTE, AS MADE
OPERATIVE AGAINST THE OWNER OF
ANTELOPE ISLAND BY THE MAJORITY
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OPINION, VIOLATES THE GUARANTEES OF
APPELLANT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
The handwriting is clear in this case, as the Statute
is not, that the treatment accorded by the majority opinion
to the three issues raised in the Appeal and urged in this
Petition for Rehearing, operate to deprive Appellant of its
property, held for better than eighty years, without due
process of law.
The great Ordinance of the 14th Amendment of the
National Constitution and Section 7 of Article I of the Utah
Charter, declaring that:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law,''
makes it mandB-tory that in the field of eminent domain, a
statute appear in black and white and that we know of its
import beyond equivocatior.. and reasonable argument. The
very freedom of man and our social order hang in the balance of that mandate. If private property can be expropriated by a government agency under the auspices of an ambiguous and argumentative statute, democracy, as well as
this individual Appellant, is the loser.
The whole trouble with the majority opinion m the
major issues set forth in this Petition is that the issue is
determined no:; upon the basis of what the legislature, in
fact, did, but upon what the majority opinion believes it
should have done. Admittedly, the Statute creates a maze
of uncertainty, ambiguity and argument. To sustain the
grant of eminent domain power and uphold the constitu-

tionality of the Law, the majority opinion is required to employ construction technique upon technique, with the result
dependent upon that technique which is utilized and that
which is discarded.
The time has come for this Court to say to the Legislature that if it is going to enact laws which substantially
affect the lives and propel ty of man in this day, it will
have to state jts intentions clearly and unequivocally, so
that men of ordinary intellect can understand its meaning.
And further, if it does not, and if it passes legislation
wherein the eminent domain power as to a landowner's
property is placed in doubt, the statute will be stricken
down and the condemnation power will be denied.
The failure of the majority opinion to consider the
factors set out in the accompanying Petition for Rehearing
and this Brief, are material to and dispositive of this case.
To consider those factors and accord Appellant due process
of law, a rehearing of the case should be ordered.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE W. LATIMER,
and
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR.,
of
PARSONS, BEHLE, EVANS
& LATIMER,
520 Kearns Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah,
Attorneys for Appellant.

